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This paper proposes a multiple contingencies model that examines the combined effect of departmental interde-
pendencies and organization structures on management accounting system (MAS) design. The model was tested by
means of empirical data collected from a questionnaire addressed to 160 production managers. The response rate was
82.5%. The findings provide some support for the notion that organizations adapt their MAS design to the control
requirements of the situation. Furthermore, the study offers some empirical support for the existence of suboptimal
equifinality. That is, in situations which lack of a single dominant imperative, several alternative, and functionally
equivalent management control system (MCS) designs, may arise.
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Since the mid-eighties, there has been a trend in
manufacturing towards customization and novel
approaches to organizing production, including
JIT/TQM models of control (Schonberger, 1986;
Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990). The pursuit of
such strategies poses significant challenges for the
management since they typically imply intensified
interdependencies among functionally differenti-
ated departments and new means of managing the
workflow (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000; Kala-
gnanam & Lindsay, 1998). As organizations adapt
to these developments, they must make sure that* Tel.: +46-19-30-30-00; fax: +46-19-33-25-46.
E-mail address: jonas.gerdin@esi.oru.se (J. Gerdin).
0361-3682/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserve
doi:10.1016/j.aos.2003.11.003the MAS is designed congruent with the new
control requirements (Chenhall, 2003). Drawing
on contingency-based approaches, it is argued that
the study of appropriate MAS designs in these new
settings can be enhanced by considering the fit
between the MAS, departmental interdependen-
cies 1 and organizational structure (Chenhall &
Morris, 1986; Hayes, 1977; Macintosh & Daft,
1987; Williams, Macintosh, & Moore, 1990). This
study adds to research in this area by proposing a
multiple contingencies model that examines the
combined effect of departmental interdependencies1 Departmental interdependencies are defined here as the
extent to which departments need to rely on other departments
for resources, such as materials and knowledge, to accomplish
their respective tasks (Thompson, 1967).
d.
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outlines the proposed model.
The multiple contingencies model stems from
recognition that the demands placed on MAS
design by multiple contingencies may conflict
(Fisher, 1995), i.e., attempts to satisfy one demand
may mean that other demands cannot be satisfied.
It is also explicitly assumed that the need for
coordination and control can be met by several
alternative, and equifinal, management control
system design strategies. The assumption is justi-
fied by the long-held view that management con-
trol subsystems may not only complement each
other but also substitute for each other (Fisher,
1995; Galbraith, 1973; Mintzberg, 1983). Finally,
the current study contributes to the management
control literature by adopting a more holistic ap-
proach than has typically been the case. It is true
that a so-called systems approach has been used
for some time in the organization design literature
(see e.g., Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Miller &
Friesen, 1984; Mintzberg, 1983). However, very
few researchers have looked on the MAS as a
system with internal consistency among multiple
structural characteristics (see e.g., Chenhall &
Langfield-Smith, 1998a; Greve, 1999).
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. The following two sections define the
constructs, develop the theoretical model, and
conclude with a number of exploratory proposi-
tions. The process of data collection and data
analysis is then detailed in the fourth section. The
results of the study are presented and discussed in
the fifth and sixth sections, respectively. The last
section contains concluding comments and some
suggestions regarding future research.Departmental
interdependence
Organization
structure
Fig. 1. ResearcDefinition of constructs
For a long time there has been an interest among
scholars in documenting fit relationships between
features of context in which the organization
operates and its management control arrange-
ments. One key characteristic of the literature is
that the identification of variables is typically based
on the assumption that they are related to each
other in a one-to-one manner, i.e., in a particular
context, there is only one optimal combination of
management control mechanisms (Gresov, 1989;
Gresov & Drazin, 1997). For example, it is nor-
mally expected that low task uncertainty will be
coupled with a mechanistic organization structure
and an ‘‘efficiency-focused’’ performance evalua-
tion system, if the organization is to perform well
(Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Macintosh, 1994).
A second key characteristic is that definitions
normally are derived from prior literature (see e.g.,
Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000; Macintosh & Daft,
1987). Although the merits of this approach are
acknowledged, in terms of providing stringency in
theory development and testing, it is also impor-
tant that the limitations be understood. One such
limitation is that the sole use of established ty-
pologies, e.g., the extensive use of the mechanistic/
organic structure continuum developed by Burns
and Stalker in 1961 (cf. Abernethy & Lillis, 1995;
Gordon & Narayanan, 1984; Kalagnanam &
Lindsay, 1998), risks overlooking more recently
developed structural designs. For example, Chen-
hall (2003, p. 21) notes that ‘‘an important element
of contemporary structures is teams. As yet there
are few studies that have considered the role of
MCS within team based structures’’. The absenceMAS design
h model.
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MAS research may give weak or inconsistent re-
sults because they have the potential to funda-
mentally change the way that integration and
adaptation in managing functional interdepen-
dencies is achieved (Chenhall, 2003).
Furthermore, it has been argued elsewhere that
the study of equifinality implies a different ap-
proach to research design compared with that of
traditional contingency theory (Doty & Glick,
1994; Gresov & Drazin, 1997). In particular, the
use of a priori dichotomies sharply limits the possi-
bility of identifying several equally effective struc-
tural designs in a particular situation (Gresov &
Drazin, 1997). Therefore, Gresov and Drazin
(1997), discussing how to conduct equifinality re-
search, suggest that the identification of design
variables should be ‘‘deduced as well as supple-
mented with inductive identification of the range
of available structures’’ (p. 419). Based on these
arguments, the approach set out below is to first
derive the elements used to describe the organiza-
tion structure, and the MAS, from prior account-
ing-control literature. Two categorizations of
departments are then empirically derived on the
basis of their values on the organizational struc-
ture elements and the MAS elements, respectively.
Since one of the objectives of this study is to de-
scribe the MAS as a system with internal consis-Table 1
Research variables
Variables Description
Departmental interdependence
Sequential interdependence Work flows between departments
Reciprocal interdependence Work flows back and forth betwe
task is determined by the particul
Organizational structure
The Functional unit Formalized procedures, medium s
making, and reliance on the funct
The Lateral unit Nonformalized behavior, large an
product basis for grouping units
The Simple unit Little behavior is formalized, sma
centralized, and a product-oriente
MAS design
The Rudimentary MAS All types of accounting informati
The Broad scope MAS Budgetary and operational inform
The Traditional MAS Detailed budget and product costtency among multiple structural characteristics,
cluster analysis is used to explore how the elements
combine. Cluster analysis provides a sophisticated
means of determining how they combine insofar as
it groups observations into clusters such that each
cluster is as homogeneous as possible with respect
to the characteristics of interest and the groups are
as different as possible (see sections Data analysis
and Results below for a detailed description of
how categories were derived). Table 1 summarizes
the definition of constructs. The organization
structure and MAS categories are based on the
cluster solutions provided in section Results,
Table 7.
In the following three sections, each variable in
Table 1 is discussed in more detail and related to
prior literature.
Departmental interdependence
Departmental interdependence means the ex-
tent to which departments depend upon each other
for resources to accomplish their tasks. The con-
struct relates to the work of Thompson (1967),
where three types of dependence were identified:
pooled, sequential and reciprocal. Pooled depen-
dence is the lowest form. In this type of depen-
dence, departments are relatively autonomous in
that little work flows between them. Sequentialin a serial fashion
en departments and the selection, combination and order of the
ar problem in question
ized and medium complex, centralized power for decision-
ional basis for grouping tasks
d complex, decentralized decision-making and relies on the
ll size and low complexity, power over decisions is fairly
d unit grouping
on is aggregated and seldom issued
ation is detailed and reported frequently
reports are issued frequently
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becoming the inputs of another unit. This implies
that one unit cannot act before receiving the input
from the preceding unit (cf. mass production
assembly lines). Reciprocal dependence represents
the highest form of interdependence. The move-
ment of work back and forth between units char-
acterizes this type. In the case of manufacturing
firms, reciprocal dependence typically occurs when
several departments are involved in a product
development project.
Interdependencies will always exist between the
manufacturing department and other subunits
(e.g., marketing and purchasing) because the pro-
duction function reflects only one link in the
organizations value chain. Theoretically, it would
be possible for a manufacturing departments
interdependence to be limited to pooled depen-
dence. However, this is an unlikely scenario as
extensive stockpiling between subunits ‘‘is an
expensive option and one that successful firms are
unlikely to pursue’’ (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000,
p. 224). Therefore, only the sequential and re-
ciprocal forms of interdepartmental dependence
were used in the present study (see Table 1).
Organizational structure
The organizational structure variable draws
heavily on the seminal works of Bruns and Wa-
terhouse (1975), and Merchant (1981, 1984), who
identified several organizational characteristics
that were strongly related to the choice of
accounting-control strategy. In summary, they
found that as organizations and departments grow
and become more complex, they tend to decen-
tralize and implement a more administratively
oriented control strategy, which involves a higher
degree of behavior formalization and an increasing
use of formal patterns of communication. In line
with expectations, they also found that the MASs
in these organizations ‘‘matched’’ the overall
control strategy insofar as they tended to use ‘‘a
more highly developed and formal budgeting sys-
tem, with greater standardization of information
flows and greater operating manager involvement
in budgeting’’ (Merchant, 1984, p. 291). In con-
trast, smaller, more homogeneous and centralizedfirms tended to rely more highly on informal,
personally oriented control mechanisms such as
direct supervision and face-to-face communica-
tion. Accordingly, firms were less reliant on formal
use of the budget when using this interpersonal
control strategy.
Based on the studies of Bruns and Waterhouse,
and Merchant, four design elements were identi-
fied, which have the potential to influence MAS
design, namely degree of behavior formalization
(i.e., the extent to which work processes are stan-
dardized), unit size, complexity (degree of differ-
entiation), and degree of decentralization. These
elements have also been found to be relevant in
more recent contingency-style accounting-control
research (see e.g., Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Gor-
don & Narayanan, 1984; Gul & Chia, 1994; Lind,
2001; Mia & Chenhall, 1994).
When attempting to extend empirical research
in any area, it is important to keep variables
constant over time. However, it is also important
that the design elements used be able to provide
for emerging structural designs. Therefore, it was
decided to include a fifth element––unit group-
ing––to allow a distinction between traditional
grouping by function, and more recently devel-
oped product-oriented structures (Galbraith, 1993,
1994; Nemetz & Fry, 1988). Recent research indi-
cates that as uncertainty in manufacturing in-
creases, e.g., as the result of a customization
strategy and the adoption of JIT production sys-
tems, more reliance is placed on teamwork to
achieve integration and adaptation in managing
functional interdependencies (Abernethy & Lillis,
1995; Galbraith, 1993, 1994; Kalagnanam &
Lindsay, 1998).
As was mentioned above, categories of depart-
ments were empirically derived based on their
values on the five organizational design elements
developed above (i.e., degree of behavior formal-
ization, unit size, complexity, degree of decentral-
ization, and principles of unit grouping) and
cluster analysis was used to determine the way the
elements combined. The results of the clustering
procedure are provided in Table 7. A negative sign
on the elements means that the centroid value of
the departments contained in the cluster is below
average while a positive sign denotes the opposite.
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the degree of formalization is higher than average
for departments contained in Cluster 1 while it is
lower than average for departments contained in
Cluster 3, for instance. In Table 1, the profiles of
the three cluster solutions are described verbally.
Below, each of the cluster profiles depicted in Ta-
ble 1 are described in more detail and related to
previous research.
Both the first and second organizational designs
(i.e., the Functional unit and the Lateral unit)
depicted in Table 1 have characteristics akin to the
administratively oriented organizational-control
strategy identified by Bruns and Waterhouse
(1975), and Merchant (1981, 1984), yet they are
dissimilar. For example, departments in the second
category (the Lateral unit) are typically larger and
more complex than the average, and decision-
making is more decentralized. However, they do
not rely heavily on formalized standard operating
procedures and rules to govern work relations as
suggested by Bruns and Waterhouse, and Mer-
chant (cf. the centroid value on the formalization
design element for Cluster 2 in Table 7, which is
slightly below the average). However, behavior
formalization is a key characteristic of the first
category of departments (cf. the positive centroid
value on the formalization design element for
Cluster 1 in Table 7). These departments also are
fairly large and complex. 2 If we consider the unit-
grouping element, the picture becomes clearer.
Unit grouping by function, combined with a high
degree of centralization of authority and a high
degree of behavior formalization, has apparent
similarities with the ‘‘mechanistic design’’ con-
struct, traditionally employed in the organiza-
tional design literature (Burns & Stalker, 1961;
Mintzberg, 1983; Nemetz & Fry, 1988), and more
recently applied to manufacturing settings in the
accounting-control literature (see e.g., Abernethy
& Lillis, 1995; Kalagnanam & Lindsay, 1998). This
literature suggests that these designs are highly
bureaucratic and rigid. The prime coordination2 An analysis of raw data shows that these departments have
around 230 full-time employees, and the average number of
organizational levels and job titles are 3 and 13, respectively.mechanism is standardization of work processes.
Any communication stemming from unexpected
problems in the workflow is largely formalized
using vertical communication channels. In the
following sections, this organizational design will
be referred to in terms of Functional units.
In contrast, the second organization structure in
Table 1 borrows characteristics from an organi-
zational form that has been discussed in the
organizational-control literature in recent years,
namely the ‘‘Lateral organization’’ (Abernethy &
Lillis, 1995; Galbraith, 1993, 1994; Kalagnanam &
Lindsay, 1998). In contrast to Functional units,
these departments exhibit greater decentralization
of control and authority, and rely more on prod-
uct-oriented unit grouping to achieve integration
and adaptation in managing workflow interde-
pendencies (cf. the profiles of Functional units
(Cluster 1) and Lateral units (Cluster 2) in Table
7). Accordingly, these departments will be referred
to as Lateral units.
The third organizational design depicted in
Table 1 has a profile similar to that of the inter-
personal strategy approach to organizational
control identified by Bruns and Waterhouse
(1975), and Merchant (1981, 1984). That is, when
compared with the other two organizational forms
derived, these units are smaller, less complex, little
of their behavior is formalized, and they are fairly
centralized (cf. the profile of Cluster 3 in Table 7).
This organizational type has also been discussed in
the organizational design literature. For example,
Mintzberg (1983) identified a category of compa-
nies that he called the Simple structure. According
to Mintzberg this structure ‘‘is characterized,
above all, by what it is not––elaborated’’ (p. 157).
With this in mind, the third organizational design
will be referred to in terms of Simple units.
Management accounting system
The MAS was defined as those parts of the
formalized information system used by organiza-
tions to influence the behavior of their managers
that leads to the attainment of organizational
objectives (Horngren, Bhimani, Datar, & Foster,
2002). The design of the MAS was conceptualized
in terms of two interrelated dimensions: level of
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is that managers in some organizational con-
texts are likely to benefit from accounting infor-
mation that is detailed and issued frequently,
whereas MAS information in other contexts tends
to be general rather than detailed, and issued
less frequently (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000;
Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Davila, 2000; Macin-
tosh, 1994; Macintosh & Daft, 1987; Merchant,
1981).
Three critical elements of the MAS were
examined with respect to their level of detail and
frequency of reporting: the operating budget, the
standard costing system, and the reliance on
operational information. There is ample evidence
from surveys recently conducted in many countries
that these aspects of the MAS are widely adopted
and are perceived useful by managers (see, e.g.,
Ask & Ax, 1997; Brierley, Cowton, & Drury, 2001;
Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b; Lukka &
Granlund, 1996). The operating budget is used to
schedule and record department revenues and
expenditures, including materials and salaries.
Usually, a budget is generated for the forthcoming
period, and periodic budget follow-up reports are
issued to provide information to department
managers about progress toward budget targets.
In contrast to the operating budget, in which costs
are recorded at the cost-center level, the standard
costing system provides information at the product
level. Typically, standard costs are used to aid
managerial decision-making by providing pro-
jected product costs. However, standards also en-
able management periodically to compare actual
costs with standard costs in order to gauge per-
formance and to correct inefficiencies (Ask & Ax,
1997).
In addition to the two financially based man-
agement accounting techniques mentioned above,
manufacturing departments rely on operational
information that provides management with data
on departmental outputs and performance, e.g.,
production volumes, lead and delivery times,
product defects and resource consumption. Recent
empirical findings suggest that nonfinancial data
should have a prominent place in manufacturing
departments (Kaplan, 1983), not the least in
companies emphasizing customization and manu-facturing flexibility (Chenhall, 1997; Perera, Har-
rison, & Poole, 1997).
The categories of MASs identified by means of
the cluster analysis are depicted in Table 1 (cf. the
cluster profiles in Table 7). The first category had
the lowest scores on every aspect of the MAS.
Compared with the other MASs identified,
accounting information is less detailed and is is-
sued less frequently on all three parts of the sys-
tem. A suitable name for this cluster is therefore
Rudimentary MAS. The second and third MAS
categories share the common denominator of a
sophisticated budgetary system insofar as infor-
mation on subunits is detailed and reported fre-
quently. However, with respect to the other MAS
elements (i.e., the standard costing system and
reliance on operational information), the two
categories differ significantly.
MASs in the second category are characterized
by frequent issuing of detailed nonfinancial infor-
mation, while the standard cost reports have the
opposite characteristics. Therefore, this category
has similarities with so-called broad scope MASs
insofar as information provided is also nonfinan-
cial (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000; Mia & Chen-
hall, 1994). Therefore, these systems are called
Broad scope MASs.
In contrast, the third category of MASs has a
profile almost the opposite of that of the previous
cluster. That is, it has a well-developed standard
costing system, but reliance on operations-based
measures is fairly low. Therefore, this type of
system resembles the notion of traditional
accounting systems (narrow-scope MAS) in that
these systems are typically limited to providing
financially oriented information (Bouwens &
Abernethy, 2000; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Gul &
Chia, 1994; Mia & Chenhall, 1994). In the light of
this profile, they will be referred to as Traditional
MASs.Theory development
The theoretical model is developed in two
stages. Firstly, the impact of each variable on
MAS design in isolation is examined. Secondly,
the combined effect of departmental interdepen-
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number of exploratory propositions are presented.
Departmental interdependence and MAS design
Sequential interdependence puts great demands
on the organization for coordination and close
control (Macintosh, 1994; Thompson, 1967), and
since input/output relations typically are under-
stood in these situations, MAS information has
the potential to play a key part in accomplishing
this task. Plans and schedules are crucial to ensure
that no activities in the value chain are underuti-
lized and that departments provide necessary re-
sources for other departments (Van de Ven,
Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). Detailed and frequent
measurements of output ensure that management
can monitor whether activities are on schedule and
can respond to exceptions and deviations that arise
(Macintosh & Daft, 1987).
These findings provide little guidance on whe-
ther traditional financially based or more broad
scope MASs are preferred for sequentially depen-
dent departments. However, it has been argued
that standard costing systems, with their focus on
task segregation and efficiency, are well suited for
standard production (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995;
Kaplan, 1983; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978).
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that tradi-
tional systems are associated with sequential
interdependence (cf. Chenhall, 2003). However,
empirical research indicates that nonfinancial
information may also be used in subunits experi-
encing sequential interdependence. For example,
Macintosh and Daft (1987) found that several
statistical report characteristics as well as operat-
ing budget characteristics were positively related to
sequential interdependence. Therefore, it is likely
to find broad scope MASs under these conditions
(cf. Macintosh, 1994).
In contrast, MASs are expected to be less useful
for accomplishing coordination and control of
reciprocally interdependent units because the ab-
sence of standardization makes it difficult to
specify unambiguous performance standards
(Macintosh, 1994). Rather, coordination and
control come from rapid mutual adjustment and
personal interaction (Thompson, 1967; Van deVen et al., 1976). Accordingly, the training and
socialization of employees become more important
than formal management control systems such as
operating budgets and statistical reports (cf.
Hayes, 1977; Macintosh & Daft, 1987; Van de Ven
et al., 1976; Williams et al., 1990).
In summary, sequentially linked departments
put great demands on the organization for coor-
dination and close control. This may be accom-
plished by means of rigorous planning and
measurement systems (cf. the Traditional MAS
and the Broad scope MAS). In contrast, reciprocal
interdependence requires real-time, intensive
information flows between the various depart-
ments. MASs are not well suited to these needs.
Therefore, reciprocal interdependence may be
proposed to be associated with rudimentary
MASs.
Organizational structure and MAS design
In the literature, a mechanistic manufacturing
design, which characterizes Functional units, has
generally been associated with a traditional
financially based MAS (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995,
Kaplan, 1983; Macintosh, 1985; Merchant, 1984).
The argument is that these systems, which
emphasize task segregation and efficiency, are well
suited for mass producers of standard products.
Furthermore, earlier research indicates that a large
unit size increases the reliance on sophisticated
financially oriented subsystems such as the oper-
ating budget (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Mer-
chant, 1981, 1984) and the product-costing system
(Bjørnenak, 1997; Innes & Mitchell, 1995).
The Lateral unit design has become more
important in manufacturing departments during
the last decades (Galbraith, 1993, 1994). Very few
accounting-control researchers have examined the
direct effects of this organization structure on
MAS design (see, e.g., Abernethy & Lillis, 1995).
However, considerable effort has been invested in
exploring the impact of modern management
practices––JIT/TQM production in particular––on
different aspects of the MAS (Chenhall, 1997;
Fullerton & McWatters, 2002; Ittner & Larcker,
1995). Based on the argument that the profile of
Lateral units is consistent with these modern
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tween this organizational structure and MAS de-
sign will be based on this literature. However, it
should be noted that in these studies, organization
structure is only one explanatory variable among
several others (e.g., reliance on programs to im-
prove quality, time delays and waste). 3 Accord-
ingly, expectations derived should be regarded as
tentative.
According to the literature that has examined
the association between JIT/TQM and MAS,
Lateral units should increase their reliance on
nonfinancial information (Chenhall, 1997; Fuller-
ton & McWatters, 2002; Ittner & Larcker, 1995;
Johnson, 1992). One argument is that the MAS
must support these new management practices by
‘‘monitoring, identifying, and communicating to
decision makers the sources of delay, error, and
waste in the system’’ (Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan,
& Young, 2001, p. 244). It is also argued that the
MAS information in Lateral units should focus on
those factors that support their strategic commit-
ment to customer-adaptation and flexibility
(Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Perera et al., 1997).
However, the role of financial information in this
organizational context is unclear. Whilst there is
considerable normative support for the idea that
traditional accounting measures based on budget
variances are inappropriate in JIT/TQM environ-
ments because they do not track the sources of
competitiveness (Johnson, 1992; Kaplan, 1983),
recent empirical research indicates that operations-
based information complements, rather than sub-
stitutes for, financially oriented information (cf.
Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998a; Tayles &
Drury, 1994). Accordingly, it can be expected that
Broad scope MASs are extensively used among
Lateral units.
Referring to section Definition of constructs
above, the findings of Bruns and Waterhouse
(1975) and Merchant (1981, 1984) suggest that
Simple units typically adopt an interpersonal
control strategy. Therefore, it is reasonable to be-3 The author is indebted to one anonymous reviewer for
pointing this out.lieve that formal control mechanisms, such as the
MAS, are unnecessary and expensive ways of
coordinating and controlling behavior in Simple
units (Mintzberg, 1983). Accordingly, Rudimen-
tary MASs should dominate in these units
(Bjørnenak, 1997; Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975;
Innes & Mitchell, 1995; Merchant, 1981, 1984).
In summary, it is proposed that different MASs
should be associated with each organizational
structure. The demand for central planning and
efficiency measurement imposed by the Functional
unit, implies a high reliance on the operating
budget and the standard costing system (cf. the
Traditional MAS). In contrast, Lateral units
should benefit most from the Broad scope MAS to
handle customer-initiated demands. Finally, Sim-
ple units tend to be more reliant on direct super-
vision and more frequent personal interactions
and less on formal communication via the MAS.
Accordingly, the Rudimentary MAS should
dominate in these units.
The combined effect of departmental interdepen-
dence and organizational structure on MAS design
Based on the ‘‘bivariate’’ theory development in
the prior two sections, the research model is ex-
tended to include the combined effect of depart-
mental interdependence and organization
structure on MAS design. However, before we
address the question of which MASs are most
likely to be used in different organizational con-
texts, we shall discuss the extent to which different
combinations of interdependence and organiza-
tional designs are viable. The premise is that po-
tential misfit between interdependencies and
structure may have consequences for MAS design
in these contexts (Gresov, 1989; Gresov & Drazin,
1997).
Relations between departmental interdependence
and organizational structure
While the importance of departmental interde-
pendence for the design of organizations for long
has been stressed in the literature (Fry, 1982;
Pennings, 1992; Thompson, 1967), there are only a
few studies that have empirically explored the
relationship between these variables. However,
4 The results in Table 9 in Appendix A provide some
empirical support for these expectations. Functional units and
Lateral units were the most widely used structures under
conditions of sequential and reciprocal interdependence, respec-
tively. A chi square test showed that the differences were
statistically significant (p ¼ 0:038).
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(1976) who found that impersonal means of
coordinating sequentially interdependent depart-
ments (e.g., rules and plans), being the least costly
mechanisms to operate, are used the most. How-
ever, as interdependencies increase, reliance on
these means declines while the use of more
expensive coordination mechanisms increases sig-
nificantly (e.g., horizontal channels and group
meetings). Some of these results have been con-
firmed in subsequent studies (see, e.g., Gresov,
1989; Ito & Peterson, 1986; Macintosh & Daft,
1987).
These arguments, when applied to the present
study, suggest that the mechanistic design that
characterizes Functional units should be preferred
under conditions of sequential interdependence.
There is also reason to believe that Lateral units,
which exhibit greater decentralization of control
and authority and rely more on product-oriented
unit grouping to achieve integration and adapta-
tion in managing workflow interdependencies,
should be preferred in situations characterized by
reciprocal interdependence between subunits.
Based on prior research, it is more difficult to
determine whether the Simple unit is likely to be
used most under conditions of sequential or re-
ciprocal interdependence. On the one hand, it has
been suggested elsewhere that the pressure to run
sequentially interdependent departments without
interruption is likely to lead to a strong control
mentality from the top to coordinate the workflow
(Mintzberg, 1983). Therefore, Simple units, char-
acterized by centralized decision-making, seem
appropriate in these conditions. On the other
hand, it is difficult to argue that Simple structures
necessarily are inappropriate in departments fac-
ing reciprocal interdependencies. True, the litera-
ture convincingly argues that coordination and
control must come from rapid mutual adjustment
and face-to-face communication among empow-
ered coworkers (Gresov, 1989; Thompson, 1967;
Van de Ven et al., 1976). However, this idea seems
to be based on the assumption that the organiza-
tion is so large that coordination by means of the
hierarchy is impossible. In small and noncomplex
units, department managers may very well be
highly familiar with the actual operations(Mintzberg, 1983). Consequently, workflow inter-
dependencies between departments can be handled
by direct supervision, and department manage-
ment can directly solve problems encountered (cf.
the interpersonal control strategy identified by
Bruns & Waterhouse (1975) and Merchant (1981,
1984)).
The above arguments have several important
implications. Firstly, while Functional and Lateral
units are likely to be preferred under sequential
and reciprocal interdependence, respectively,
Simple units have the potential to be appropriate
in both contexts. 4 This in turn implies a form of
equifinality insofar as several structural designs
may be suitable in the same contextual setting.
Secondly, drawing on Gresov and Drazin (1997), it
is important that the development of hypothe-
ses below for Functional and Lateral units ad-
dresses the possible implications on MAS design of
misfit between interdependencies and structural
design.Relations between interdependence, organization
structure and MAS design
In this section, the complexity of the analysis
(cf. Fisher (1995)) is increased in two important
and interrelated respects compared with the
‘‘bivariate’’ theory development in sections
Departmental interdependence and MAS design
and Organizational structure and MAS design.
Firstly, it is acknowledged that MAS design may
have to be tailored to multiple contextual factors,
namely interdependencies and organization de-
sign. Because demands may conflict, MAS design
may involve tradeoffs that preclude a ‘‘fit’’ to all
factors simultaneously (Fisher, 1995; Gresov,
1989).
Secondly, unlike most prior studies, it is
explicitly assumed that the need for coordination
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equifinal, management control system design
strategies. The assumption is justified by the long-
held view that management control subsystems
not only may complement each other but also may
substitute for each other (Fisher, 1995; Galbraith,
1973; Mintzberg, 1983). Substitution is most likely
to occur when the design alternatives available are
functionally equivalent. As Galbraith (1973)
pointed out, for example, there are at least two
design strategies by which the organization can
increase its information-processing capacity: (i)
through the investment in vertical information
systems and (ii) through the development of lateral
relationships. Importantly, the organization is
unlikely to pursue both structures simultaneously
because of the duplication of costs or fundamental
incompatibilities between the two designs. Fur-
thermore, when considering several functionally
equivalent design strategies, profit-maximizing
organizations will prefer the alternative that pro-
vides the required outcome at the lowest cost
(Donaldsom, 1996; Mintzberg, 1983; Thompson,
1967).
Table 2 summarizes the ‘‘bivariate’’ theory
development set out in sections Departmental
interdependence and MAS design and Organiza-
tional structure and MAS design where the impact
of each contextual variable on MAS design in
isolation was examined. In the north-east part of
the table, we find the expected implications of the
two forms of interdependencies on MAS design
(i.e., sequential interdependencies will be associ-
ated with the Traditional MAS and the Broad
scope MAS while reciprocal interdependencies will
be associated with the Rudimentary MAS). In the
south-west part of the table, the expected rela-
tionships between the three organizational struc-Table 2
Implications of departmental interdependence and organizational str
Sequential interdepende
fl
Traditional MAS and/o
Functional unitfiTraditinal MAS Cell 1
Lateral unitfiBroad scope MAS Cell 2
Simple unitfiRudimentary MAS Cell 3tures and MAS design are shown. Below, the
research model is extended to include the combined
effect of these two variables on MAS design. That
is, we address the question of which MASs are
most likely to be used in each combination of
interdependence and organization structure (Cells
1–6). Let us start with the expected combined effect
of the Functional unit experiencing sequential
interdependencies on MAS design (Cell 1 in
Table 2).
Cell 1: Functional units experiencing sequential
interdependence. This cell is quite unproblematic
since this combination of interdependence and
structural design is likely to be viable, and the
MAS design implications of both variables are
fairly consistent. That is, sequential interdepen-
dence implies that units should benefit from a
sophisticated MAS (i.e., the Traditional or the
Broad scope MAS), while a functional organiza-
tion structure implies that a Traditional MAS
should be used extensively for coordination and
control purposes. Overall, this suggests that, in all
cases, traditional MASs should be common in
these contexts.
However, based on the argument that both
Traditional and Broad scope MASs should be able
to perform the same underlying function (cf.
Gresov & Drazin, 1997), of ensuring that the units
provide necessary resources to other sequentially
linked units in a timely manner by means of fre-
quent and detailed planning and measurement
(Macintosh, 1994; Macintosh & Daft, 1987), it can
be expected that the Broad scope MAS may also
be extensively used in this organizational context.
Note that this implies the presence of equifinality
in the sense that both MASs represent functionally
equivalent alternatives to achieving coordinationucture on MAS design
nce Reciprocal interdependence
fl
r Broad scope MAS Rudimentary MAS
Cell 4
Cell 5
Cell 6
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sequential interdependence.
According to sections Departmental interde-
pendence and MAS design and Organizational
structure and MAS design, both sequential inter-
dependence and a traditional functionally oriented
structure call for rigorous planning and measure-
ment systems (cf. Lind, 2001; Macintosh, 1994).
Therefore, it can be expected that the MAS and
the organization structure are used in a reinforcing
way, implying a complementary relationship. That
is, an appropriate organization structure alone
may not be sufficient to achieve high organiza-
tional performance. Therefore, the focus on task
segregation and efficiency should be comple-
mented by sophisticated planning and control
systems to ensure sufficient coordination among
sequentially dependent parts. Accordingly, the
number of departments having Rudimentary
MASs in this context should be relatively few.
To sum up, for Functional units experiencing
sequential interdependence (Cell 1 in Table 2), both
Traditional MASs and Broad scope MASs will be
over-represented while Rudimentary MASs will be
under-represented. Over- (under-)representation
means that the number of departments having the
proposed MAS in a particular cell, as a proportion
of all departments in that cell, will be significantly
higher (lower) than the average proportion of
departments having that MAS across the overall
sample. That is, it is expected that MAS propor-
tions in individual cells will differ from MAS
proportions in the whole sample because organi-
zations adapt their systems to the requirements of
their particular contexts.
Cell 2: Lateral units experiencing sequential inter-
dependence. The contextual situation in this cell
gives rise to at least two important issues related to
MAS design. Firstly, we must consider the po-
tential effects of ‘‘misfit’’ between interdependence
and organizational structure. Referring to the
discussion in the former section, organizations
with sequentially dependent units are likely to
prefer structural characteristics associated with a
mechanistic design. However, this does not imply
that a more organic structure, characterizing Lat-
eral units, is incapable of meeting the demands onthe organization for coordination of sequentially
interdependent tasks. It merely implies that
unnecessarily expensive means of coordinating
tasks are used. Thus, the ‘‘misfit’’ between inter-
dependence and organization structure in Cell 2
does not mean that MAS designers are confronted
with an inherent and critical conflict in contingen-
cies. This is apparent in Table 2, which indicates
that both contextual factors imply that units in
this situation should benefit from a sophisticated
MAS (i.e., a Traditional MAS or a Broad scope
MAS).
This leads to the second issue raised by the
contextual situation in Cell 2, namely the question
of which (if any) of the two more sophisticated
MASs is likely to be preferred. According to Table
2, the accounting-control literature suggests that
either a Traditional or a Broad scope MAS is
appropriate for coordination and control under
sequential interdependence, while only a Broad
scope MAS is expected to be extensively used
among Lateral units. Although it was argued
above that both Traditional and Broad scope
MASs should be able to perform the same
underlying function, in terms of providing close
control of sequentially dependent units, there is no
reason to believe that Lateral units, when per-
forming this fundamental function, should prefer
traditional information to operations-based
information. The premise is that only the latter
supports their strategic commitment to customer-
adaptation and flexibility (Abernethy & Lillis,
1995; Macintosh, 1985). Based on the above
arguments, it can thus be expected that for Lateral
units experiencing sequential interdependence (Cell
2 in Table 2), Broad scope MASs will be over-
represented while Traditional MASs and Rudimen-
tary MASs will be under-represented.
Cell 3: Simple units experiencing sequential inter-
dependence. In this cell, the two bivariate analyses
give seemingly contradictory results; sequential
interdependence implies that sophisticated for-
mula-based MASs should be over-represented,
whereas the Simple unit design suggests the
opposite (i.e., Rudimentary MASs). However,
there is reason to believe that at least two func-
tionally equivalent MCS design alternatives are
5 In line with the situation in Cell 1 above, this suggests a
form of equifinality insofar as several alternative MAS designs
are likely to exist in Cell 4. However, the equifinality in the
latter situation is always suboptimal (cf. Gresov & Drazin,
1997) because one or several demands on the MAS inevitable
go unattended.
110 J. Gerdin / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 99–126available for Simple units: either the demand for
coordination and close control is met by a rigorous
and detailed planning and measurement system, or
by direct supervision effected through the super-
structure. According to Mintzberg (1983) and
others (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant,
1981, 1984), only the latter alternative is viable
because direct supervision and frequent personal
interactions are the most efficient means of control
in a simple structure and the organization is un-
likely to pursue both mechanisms simultaneously
because of the duplication of costs. In other words,
a substitution effect is likely to be present. There-
fore, it is proposed that for Simple units experi-
encing sequential interdependence (Cell 3 in Table
2), Rudimentary MASs will be over-represented
while Traditional MASs and Broad scope MASs
will be under-represented.
Cell 4: Functional units experiencing reciprocal
interdependence. It was argued above that the use
of a traditional organizational design under con-
ditions of reciprocal interdependence implies a
‘‘misfit’’. Coordination of reciprocally interde-
pendent units is handled by ad hoc mutual
adjustment and feedback from both the various
units involved and from the object itself (e.g.,
Hayes, 1977; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al.,
1976; Williams et al., 1990), while the inherent
logic of coordination and control in large organi-
zations having a mechanistic design is the reliance
on sophisticated and formalized MCSs (e.g., Bruns
& Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 1984; Van de Ven
et al., 1976). Since research in accounting-control
seldom considers the possible effects of misfit be-
tween contextual factors on MAS design, the lit-
erature cannot be used to make strong predictions.
However, based on Gresov and Drazin (1997), it
can be argued that management in these situations
makes a trade-off between contextual demands.
The factors considered most important determine
what the structure should look like. Furthermore,
the lack of a single imperative typically implies
that several alternative, and equifinal, structural
designs may exist, or as Gresov (1989) put it,
‘‘there is an enhanced likelihood of design varia-
tion’’ (p. 434). Transferred to this study, this im-
plies that none of the MASs identified should beclearly over- or under-represented in Cell 4 in
Table 2. 5
Cell 5: Lateral units experiencing reciprocal inter-
dependence. While the organizational-control lit-
erature suggests that the Lateral unit design should
be viable under conditions of reciprocal interde-
pendence, Table 2 indicates that there may be a
conflict between the MAS design implications of
these contextual factors. That is, coordination and
control under conditions of reciprocal interde-
pendence come from rapid mutual adjustment and
personal interaction, whereas the large unit size
and high level of complexity characterizing the
Lateral unit, implies that a sophisticated MAS
should be used.
In a sense, the state of conflicting contingencies
in Cell 5 is more ‘‘problematic’’ than that in Cell 3
discussed above, because attempts to satisfy one
demand inevitably mean that other demands are
unsatisfied (cf. Gresov, 1989). Units may adopt a
formula-based management control strategy to
handle unit size and complexity and ignore the
need to manage external interdependence, or they
may adopt a nonformalized MCS design and
thereby ignore the control difficulties arising from
large size and complexity. However, it is not
unreasonable that MAS design in these contexts is
entirely the result of reciprocal interdependence;
i.e., unit size and complexity have very little impact
on the reliance on accounting control. The argu-
ment is that large size and complexity may very
well imply sophisticated planning and control
systems––this, however, is ‘‘not’’ possible since the
absence of standardization makes it difficult to
specify unambiguous performance standards be-
cause the optimal relationships between inputs and
outputs of production tasks are usually not known
(Macintosh, 1994). Thus, reciprocal interdepen-
dence sharply limits the number of alternative
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control package. In other words, a substitution
effect between MCS mechanisms can be expected.
In contrast to that of Cell 3 above however, the
substitution effect suggested here is not based on
the argument that both are functionally equivalent
and that management is likely to use the least
costly one. Rather, the rationale is that only one is
applicable. Based on the above arguments, it is
therefore proposed that for Lateral units facing
reciprocal interdependence (Cell 5 in Table 2),
Rudimentary MASs will be over-represented while
Traditional MASs and Broad scope MASs will be
under-represented.
Cell 6: Simple units experiencing reciprocal inter-
dependence. Finally, in conformity with Cell 1, the
situation in Cell 6 suggests that no apparent
‘‘misfit’’ between interdependencies and organiza-
tion structure exists and that the MAS design
implications of the two contextual factors are
consistent, i.e., both reciprocal interdependence
and a Simple unit design should be related to
Rudimentary MASs. Based on the arguments
presented in sections Departmental interdepen-
dence and MAS design and Organizational struc-
ture and MAS design, it is therefore proposed that
for Simple units facing reciprocal interdependence
(Cell 6 in Table 2), Rudimentary MASs will be
over-represented while Traditional MASs and
Broad Scope MASs will be under-represented.Table 3
Summary of hypothesesa
Sequential interdependence
Functional unit Cell 1
H1a Rudimentary MAS ())
H1b Broad scope MAS (+)
H1c Traditional MAS (+)
Lateral unit Cell 2
H2a Rudimentary MAS ())
H2b Broad scope MAS (+)
H2c Traditional MAS ())
Simple unit Cell 3
H3a Rudimentary MAS (+)
H3b Broad scope MAS ())
H3c Traditional MAS ())
a (+)¼MASs that are expected to be over-represented. ())¼MA
neither are expected to be over-represented, nor under-represented.The hypotheses developed above are summa-
rized in Table 3. Positive signs denote that the
MAS in question should be over-represented in
that particular context while negative signs denote
the opposite. The ‘‘(0)’’ symbol means that none of
the MASs identified should be clearly over- or
under-represented in this context.Research method
Data collection
Empirical data were collected by means of a
questionnaire survey in 1999. A pilot study
involving five manufacturing companies in differ-
ent lines of business was conducted to develop and
validate the questionnaire. One hundred and sixty
production managers from manufacturing orga-
nizations with more than 200 employees situated
in Sweden were drawn randomly from the PAR
register (industry affiliation and organizational size
are detailed in Table 4).
In a few companies, there was more than one
manufacturing department, e.g., as the result of an
overall product-oriented structure (where the
functions of order receiving, manufacturing and
sales have been brought together into self-con-
tained teams). In these cases, the production
manager responsible for the dominant part of the
manufacturing function (if any) was asked toReciprocal interdependence
Cell 4
H4a Rudimentary MAS (0)
H4b Broad scope MAS (0)
H4c Traditional MAS (0)
Cell 5
H5a Rudimentary MAS (+)
H5b Broad scope MAS ())
H5c Traditional MAS ())
Cell 6
H6a Rudimentary MAS (+)
H6b Broad scope MAS ())
H6c Traditional MAS ())
Ss that are expected to be under-represented. (0)¼MASs that
Table 4
Industry affiliation and organizational size
Industry classification Organizational
size
Food and beverages 12 No. of employees
Wood products 4 200)499 87
Pulp and paper
products
11 500)999 29
Printing industry 8 >1000 16
Chemical products 15
Rubber and plastic
products
5
Metal production 7
Metal goods 43
Machinery and
equipment
10
Electrical equipment 7
Other manufacturing 8
Unidentified companies 2
Total sample 132 132
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manager agreed to participate, a questionnaire was
sent with a covering letter, a confidentiality
agreement, and a reply-paid envelope. Questions
not correctly filled in were copied and sent to the
respondent for completion. If these were not re-
turned, missing data were substituted by the so-
called hot-deck imputation method (i.e., missing
values were estimated based on valid values of
other cases in the sample). To prevent the database
becoming biased, two conservative rules were ap-
plied. Firstly, the cases used to derive valid values
were randomly selected out of the total sample.
That is, no attempt was made to predict a missing
value based on its relationship to other variables in
the data set, since these methods run the risk of
reinforcing relationships already in the data (cf.
regression imputation discussed by Hair, Ander-
son, Tatham, & Black (1998)). Secondly, ques-
tionnaires with missing data on more than 20% of
the questions were excluded from the study. Of the
135 questionnaires received, 132 could be used,
making an effective response rate of 82.5%. Of the
25 production managers who did not return the
questionnaire, 10 indicated by telephone that they
would not fill in the questionnaire because of lack
of time. One respondent said that it was company
policy not to respond to such voluntary surveys.Variable measurements
Departmental interdependence
The instrument utilized by Macintosh and Daft
(1987) was used to measure the degree to which the
focal department relies on other departments to
accomplish its tasks. Since only sequential and
reciprocal dependence were included, the two
types of interdependence were located at the ex-
treme points of a single seven-point Likert scale
(see Appendix B).
Organizational structure
This construct was measured using six questions
about behavior formalization, unit size, complex-
ity, unit grouping and decentralization (see
Appendix B).
Behavior formalization was measured in terms
of the extent to which there were standard oper-
ating procedures, routines, job descriptions or the
like, that could guide workers when doing their
job. The instrument was based on Van de Ven and
Ferry (1980).
Departmental size was measured by the number
of full-time employees, and this number was
transformed logarithmically to adjust for expected
nonlinear impacts (Merchant, 1984; Robbins,
1990).
Complexity was conceptualized as the degree of
vertical and horizontal differentiation. The con-
struct was measured as the number of organiza-
tional levels (adapted from Miller & Dr€oge, 1986)
and the number of job titles (based on Van de Ven
& Ferry, 1980), respectively. In order to give the
two parts of the instrument equal weight in a
composite indicator of complexity in the present
department, the answers to the latter question
were first divided into quartiles and then summed
with the number of organizational levels.
Unit grouping was measured using an adapted
version of the instrument developed by Abernethy
and Lillis (1995). Production unit managers were
asked to describe their departments structure in
terms of whether it was (i) functionally oriented,
(ii) product oriented or (iii) a combination of the
two. Following the arguments of Abernethy and
Lillis (1995), a product-focused structure was
considered as a first-order response to facilitating
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tion of product and functional grouping was given
the second-highest score, etc.
Decentralization was measured using a series of
standard decisions, and identified whether man-
agers have decision autonomy. The instrument
used by Miller and Dr€oge (1986) was changed
slightly to tailor it to a manufacturing work-unit-
specific study. The calculated Cronbach alpha was
0.79.
Management accounting system design
In the contingency-based literature, MAS de-
sign has been described in many different ways (cf.
Chenhall, 2003). One common approach is that of
Chenhall and Morris (1986), who measured the
‘‘perceived usefulness’’ of different aspects of MAS
information. A major advantage of this approach
is that research findings may help system designers
to develop MASs that have the potential to assist
managers to achieve organizational goals. The
premise is that if a piece of information is per-
ceived as useful, it is likely to be used. More re-
cently, however, this approach has been criticized
because ‘‘what is perceived as useful MAS infor-
mation might not be what was available MAS
information to the user’’ (Gul & Chia, 1994, p.
419). Accordingly, in this study, which is based on
the assumption that different departmental inter-
dependencies and organizational structures should
be associated with different MASs, it is logical to
describe the MASs in terms of what is actually
supplied to managers. After all, only information
that is available can help managers to achieve
organizational goals. However, the difference be-
tween the two approaches should not be overly
exaggerated. Based on the argument that contex-
tual factors influence managers information
needs, it is reasonable to believe that these needs
are reflected in the information actually made
available to them, at least in the long run (see also
Chenhall (2003) for a more extensive discussion on
these matters).
The questions used to measure the availability
of MAS information were constructed specifically
for this study (see Appendix B). As mentioned in
section Definition of constructs, the design of each
MAS subsystem was conceptualized in terms oftwo interrelated dimensions, namely level of detail
and frequency of reporting. The level of detail in
the MAS information reported was measured on
two scales. For information on organizational
units (i.e., the operating budget and operational
information), respondents were asked to mark the
departmental levels at which different types of
information are reported. If the information
compiled concerned only the department as a
whole, it was considered as aggregated. In con-
trast, information about individual subunits was
considered as detailed. For information concern-
ing products (i.e., the standard costing system),
respondents were asked to mark whether direct
costs are specified or not and how many overhead
rates are used to allocate indirect costs. Cost
information has low detail if the system only re-
ports total direct costs and uses single overhead
rates (if any). It has high detail if direct costs are
specified and multiple overhead rates are used.
Frequency of reporting was measured, for each
MAS subsystem, on a scale ranging from ‘‘once a
year’’ to ‘‘several times a week’’. The scales were
based on experience from the pilot study.
Referring to the arguments in sections Defini-
tion of constructs and Theory development, it is
reasonable to believe that managers in some con-
texts (e.g., in Functional units experiencing
sequential interdependence) benefit from account-
ing information that is detailed and issued fre-
quently, whereas MAS information in other
contexts tends to be general rather than detailed,
and issued less frequently (e.g., in Simple units
experiencing reciprocal dependence). Therefore, a
score for use in the cluster analysis for each sub-
system was obtained by multiplying the level of
detail by the frequency of reporting. Table 5 con-
tains descriptive statistics for the three variables.
Data analysis
The data were analyzed using the following two
steps:
Firstly, the 132 manufacturing departments
were categorized with respect to their values on the
three variables. In the two cases where the vari-
ables were composed of several elements (i.e.,
organizational structure and MAS design), cluster
Table 5
Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Std dev
Departmental interdependence 3.14 1.89
Organizational structure
Formalization 5.56 1.22
Unit size 2.20 0.41
Complexity 5.77 1.56
Decentralization 2.97 0.44
Unit grouping 1.87 0.84
Management accounting system
Operating budget 34.06 23.06
Standard costing system 45.86 31.68
Operational information 43.08 19.77
Table 6
Observed and expected frequencies of departments having, and
not having, the proposed MAS in the focal cell and across the
overall sample, respectivelya
Focal cell All cells Row
totals
Departments having
the proposed MAS
22 61 83
(18.55) (64.45)
Departments not
having the
proposed MAS
16 71 87
(19.45) (88.52)
Column totals 38 132 170
a Bold numbers denote observed frequencies. Numbers in-
serted in parentheses denote expected frequencies.
114 J. Gerdin / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 99–126analysis was used to determine the way in which
they combined. Cluster analysis is a technique for
categorizing observations into groups such that
observations in each group are similar to each
other while observations in one group should be
different from those of other groups.
There are several methods for forming clusters.
In this study, a hierarchical agglomerate method
was used to compute initial cluster seeds for a
nonhierarchical method (K-means clustering). In
this way, the advantages of hierarchical methods
are complemented by the ability of the nonhier-
archical methods to ‘‘fine-tune’’ the results by
allowing the switching of cluster membership
(Hair et al., 1998). To prevent different scale
intervals from affecting the clustering procedures,
data were standardized (with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1).
Within the hierarchical cluster procedure, there
are several ways of forming clusters (see Sharma
(1996) for an overview of widely used clustering
algorithms). Wards optimizing algorithm, com-
bined with squared Euclidean distance as the
measure of similarity, was chosen on the basis that
it has been widely used within the social sciences
(Everitt, 1993). This method maximizes within-
clusters homogeneity; i.e., it minimizes the within-
group sum of squares (Sharma, 1996).
In contrast to hierarchical methods, the nonhi-
erarchical procedure does not involve the con-
struction of a treelike structure, where the results
at an earlier stage are always nested within theresults of a later stage. Instead, objects may be
reassigned if they are closer to another cluster than
the one originally assigned (Hair et al., 1998).
Furthermore, unlike hierarchical methods, the
number of clusters must be known a priori. As
mentioned above, in this study the results from the
hierarchical clustering procedure were used to
establish the number of clusters and the profile of
cluster centers for the nonhierarchical procedure.
Secondly, for each of the propositions devel-
oped above, a chi-square (v2) test was used to
examine whether the proportion of departments
having the hypothesized MAS in each cell (i.e.,
each combination of interdependence and organi-
zation structure), as a proportion of all depart-
ments in that cell, was significantly higher (lower)
than their average proportion across all cells. The
following procedure to test the propositions was
used. First, a 2 · 2 contingency table including the
observed frequencies was developed for each MAS
in each cell (see the numerical example provided in
Table 6 where the observed frequencies are
marked with bold numbers). The left column in
Table 6 contains the observed number of depart-
ments having, and not having, the proposed MAS
in the focal cell while the right column contains the
observed number of departments having, and not
having, the proposed MAS across all cells.
Next, the corresponding expected frequencies
were calculated (see the numbers inserted in
parentheses in Table 6), i.e., the frequencies that
we would theoretically expect if the variables are
J. Gerdin / Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (2005) 99–126 115independent. The expected frequencies E were
computed as follows:
Expected frequency E
¼ ðrow totalÞ  ðcolumn totalÞðgrand totalÞ ð1Þ
where grand total refers to the total number of
observations in the table. Finally, the v2 test sta-
tistic was used to test whether or not the observed
frequencies differ significantly from the expected
frequencies. The v2 tests were performed where the
expected frequencies in all cells were 2.0 or more
and at least 50% were 5.0 or more (Neter, Wass-
erman, & Whitmore, 1993).0.00
64.77
129.54
194.31
Obse
Distance
209.20
139.47
69.73
0.00
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Fig. 2. Dendograms showing the results of the hierarchical cluster a
systems.Results
As a first step, the manufacturing departments
were divided into homogeneous groups based on
their values for the three variables. The division
into sequential and reciprocal interdependence was
based on their score on the departmental interde-
pendence instrument, while cluster analysis was
used to develop categories of organizational
structure and MAS. Fig. 2 shows the dendograms
that resulted from the hierarchical cluster proce-
dures.
A critical issue in cluster analysis is the deter-
mination of the appropriate number of clusters.rvations
rvations
nalysis: (a) organisation structure, (b) management accounting
Table 7
Results of the K-mean clusteringa
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Organizational structure The Functional unit The Lateral unit The Simple unit
Formalization 0.4632 )0.0655 0:5883
Unit size )0.0667 0.7093 1:0526
Complexity )0.2020 0.7516 0:9183
Decentralization 0:3990 0.3889 )0.0334
Unit grouping 0:9113 0.4043 0.7099
Number of observations in
each cluster
48 52 32
MAS design The Rudimentary MAS The Broad scope MAS The Traditional MAS
Operating budget 0:7738 0.6951 0.6156
Standard costing system 0:4435 )0.3199 1.5232
Operational information 0:5728 0.7941 )0.0001
Number of observations in
each cluster
61 44 27
a Bold numbers denote the highest centroid values on each element. Underlined numbers denote the lowest centroid values on each
element.
6 Referring to section Data analysis above, the hypotheses
stating that the proportion of departments having the proposed
MAS in each cell, as a proportion of all departments in that
cell, is significantly higher (lower) than their average proportion
across all cells were tested by means of the v2 statistic measuring
the degree of disagreement between the observed frequencies
and the corresponding expected frequencies.
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exists. Researchers are therefore reduced to using
existing theory to identify a natural number of
clusters that are interpretable in terms of the re-
search question. However, as a complement, more
formal ‘‘rules of thumb’’ can be used. One such
method is to examine how the distance between
objects within clusters changes (the vertical axes in
Fig. 2) as the number of clusters decreases. The
idea is to identify the points where within-cluster
distance makes a sudden jump. In Fig. 2a two
‘‘jumps’’ were identified––between two and three
clusters, and between three and four clusters. Both
solutions were examined. The three-cluster solu-
tion was chosen because it provided clusters that
were consistent with previous research in the area
(see also section Definition of constructs above).
On the same grounds, the three-cluster solution in
Fig. 2b was considered the most interesting (see
also section Theory development).
The results from the hierarchical clustering
procedure were used as cluster seeds in the non-
hierarchical clustering. Table 7 shows the results
from the K-means clustering. Bold numbers de-
note the highest scores on each design element
while underlined numbers represent the lowest.
Since data were standardized (with a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1), negative signsmean that the centroid values of the objects con-
tained in the cluster are below average while po-
sitive signs denote the opposite.
As a second step, the 132 manufacturing
departments were categorized with respect to their
values on the interdependence variable and the
organizational structure variable. For each of the
six dependence/structure combinations, it was then
examined the extent to which the three MASs
identified were used. Table 8 exhibits the observed
MAS proportions and the observed frequencies
and expected frequencies (inserted in parentheses)
within each context. The MASs that are expected
to be significantly over-represented in each context
are marked with bold numbers while MASs ex-
pected to be significantly under-represented are
underlined.
Several hypotheses were supported. 6 For Lat-
eral units experiencing sequential dependence,
Table 8
Proportion of MASs in different contextsa
Sequential inter-
dependence
Reciprocal inter-
dependence
Functional unit
Rudimentary MAS 58% 30%
(22, 18.6) (3, 4.5)
Broad scope MAS 32% 40%
(12, 12.5) (4, 3.4)
Traditional MAS 10% 30%
(4, 6.9) (3, 2.1)
Lateral unit
Rudimentary MAS 29% 29%
(9, 13.3) (6, 9.2)
Broad scope MAS 52% 33%
(16, 11.4) (7, 7.0)
Traditional MAS 19% 38%ðÞ
(6, 6.3) (8, 4.8)
Simple unit
Rudimentary MAS 62% 83%
(16, 12.7) (5, 2.9)
Broad scope MAS 19% 0%b
(5, 8.1) (0, 1.9)
Traditional MAS 19% 17%b
(5, 5.3) (1, 1.2)
Asterisks in parentheses represent significant but unexpected
results. Numbers in parentheses represent observed frequencies
and expected frequencies, respectively.
p < 0:10. p < 0:05.
aUnderlined numbers denote MASs that are expected to be
over-represented. Bold numbers denote MASs that are expected
to be under-represented.
b This proposition could not be tested since a v2 test ideally
requires that the expected frequencies in all cells are 2.0 or more
(Neter et al., 1993).
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sented (H2b), while Rudimentary MASs were sig-
nificantly under-represented (H2a). Furthermore,
Rudimentary MASs were significantly over-repre-
sented among Simple units under conditions of
reciprocal interdependence (H6a). In addition, in
Simple units facing reciprocal interdependence, the
proportion of Broad scope MASs was, as ex-
pected, lower than the proportion across the
overall sample (H6b). Also for Simple units expe-
riencing sequential interdependence, the propor-
tions of Rudimentary MASs (62%) and Broad
scope MASs (19%) differ from their proportions in
the overall sample (46% and 33%, respectively) in
the proposed direction (H3a and H3b). However,
these differences were not statistically significant.Interestingly, none of the three MASs in
Functional units facing reciprocal interdependence
was significantly over- or under-represented. This
corresponds well with the general expectation ex-
pressed in H4a–H4c, i.e., that a situation of misfit
between interdependence and organization struc-
ture and, furthermore, conflicting implications of
these variables on MAS design, is likely to lead to
design variation rather than similarity.
A number of findings in Table 8 did not support
the hypotheses set out in section Theory develop-
ment. Firstly, neither of the expected associations
between Functional units experiencing sequential
interdependence and Broad scope and Traditional
MASs, respectively, was confirmed (cf. H1b and
H1c). In fact, the proportion of Traditional MASs
(10%) was, in this particular context, below the
proportion across all units (21%). Contrary to all
expectations, however, Rudimentary MASs were
over-represented among these units (cf. H1a).
However, the difference was not statistically sig-
nificant.
Secondly, no support was found for the expec-
tation that Traditional MASs should be under-
represented among Simple units experiencing
sequential or reciprocal interdependence (H3c and
H6c).
Thirdly, no support was found for the expec-
tation that Rudimentary MASs should be over-
represented among Lateral units facing reciprocal
interdependence (H5a). In fact, their proportion
was lower than would be expected. Interestingly
however, the proportion of Traditional MASs was
significantly higher in this context compared with
its proportion across all cells (cf. H5c). Further-
more, Broad scope MASs were not significantly
under-represented in this context, which is con-
trary to the expectation suggested in H5b.Discussion
The results presented above provide some
support for the expected relationships between
departmental interdependence, organizational
structure and MAS design in manufacturing
departments. Under conditions of sequential inter-
dependence, Broad scope MASs were significantly
7 It should be remembered, however, that the Lateral unit
has a relation of reciprocal dependence with other departments
within the company, which makes it difficult to isolate its
performance.
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more, the proportion of Rudimentary MASs was
generally higher among Simple units compared
with that of the overall sample.
A number of findings from the study did not
confirm prior research. Firstly, Traditional MASs
were not common among Functional units expe-
riencing sequential interdependence. Contrary to
expectations, Rudimentary MASs were somewhat
over-represented. However, the concept of equifi-
nality may help to explain this finding. That is,
Functional units may satisfy the need for coordi-
nation and control by other mechanisms (cf. the
substitution effects discussed in section The com-
bined effect of departmental interdependence and
organizational structure on MAS design). For
example, Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978, p. 72)
suggested that centralization and behavior for-
malization (cf. the characteristics of the Functional
unit) develop as an efficient means of control in
routine technologies, which implies that ‘‘planning
through procedure specification will decrease the
reliance placed on planning through the budgeting
process’’. In the same vein, Mintzberg (1983, p. 77)
argued that ‘‘direct supervision effected through
the superstructure and standardization of work
processes emerge as key mechanisms to coordinate
the work in functional structures. They are pre-
ferred because they are the tightest available con-
trol mechanisms’’.
A second interesting and unexpected finding is
the significantly high proportion of Traditional
MAS among Lateral units facing reciprocal
interdependence. This is contrary to the view in the
literature that traditional financially oriented sys-
tems are inappropriate in uncertain environments
(Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Dunk, 1992; Kaplan,
1983; Macintosh, 1985; Merchant, 1984). The
characteristics of Lateral units may provide an
explanation for the contradictory result. Galbraith
(1973) argued that decentralization and the crea-
tion of self-contained units are appropriate ways
to handle the high information-processing needs
caused by task uncertainty. However, decentral-
ization has a price since it creates a potential for
loss of control. Decentralization in large and
complex organizations is therefore often associ-
ated with well-developed systems to enable subunitperformance evaluation (Bruns & Waterhouse,
1975; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Gordon & Miller,
1976; Gul & Chia, 1994; Khandwalla, 1974; Mer-
chant, 1981; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978). How-
ever, critical prerequisites of output control are
that the units performance can be isolated and
that relevant output measures can be identified.
Referring to Table 1, these prerequisites are met in
Lateral units in that responsibility centers are or-
ganized around ‘‘natural economic entities’’,
namely products/projects. 7 These self-sustained
units can thus be held responsible for more
aggregated measures such as profits, which give
management an overall measure of the units per-
formance. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe
that financially oriented MASs, under certain
organizational conditions, may also be appropri-
ate for performance evaluation in nonroutine sit-
uations. Kaplan and Mackeys (1992) finding that
there was a greater tendency for flow shops to use
financial information for managerial performance
evaluation supports this argument.
Another, perhaps complementary, interpreta-
tion is that the financial information is used in a
way that is qualitatively different from that often
assumed in MAS research, namely performance
evaluation. For example, Hopwood (1980) and
Chapman (1997) argue that accounting informa-
tion may well be useful in uncertain contexts, but
the systems are used as ‘‘learning machines’’ rather
than as ‘‘answer machines’’. In the same vein,
Macintosh (1994, p. 117) concluded: ‘‘[I]t is not
surprising that managers are less satisfied with
controls than they are in programmable technol-
ogies. Budgets, however, can be valuable for
inducing managers to coordinate with other
departments and to speculate about future pros-
pects. Control may also be used for coordination
and planning.’’ Williams et al. (1990) and Otley
(1994) also argue in this direction. Consequently, it
can be expected that management in these decen-
tralized departments also need problem-solving
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other than organizational units (Bouwens &
Abernethy, 2000; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Gul &
Chia, 1994). The frequent issue of detailed prod-
uct-cost reports characterizing the Traditional
MAS indicates that this may be the case.
A third plausible explanation of the unexpected
result is that corporate management adapts the
company-wide MAS––in which the financial
structure is a central part––to contingency factors
influencing the firm as a whole (e.g., environmental
uncertainty, firm size, and business strategy) rather
than to particular contexts facing individual sub-
units. In other words, the level of detail and the
frequency of financial plans and measurement
systems may be imposed on subunits by top
management, while others (e.g., operations-based
information) are subject to subunit discretion.
Only the latter parts can be expected to be adapted
to the context of the individual subunit (Drazin &
Van de Ven, 1985).
Finally, the unexpected high proportion of
Traditional MASs among Lateral units may be the
result of conflicting contingencies. That is, re-
ciprocal interdependence implies coordination by
means of ad hoc mutual adjustment (e.g., Hayes,
1977; Macintosh, 1994; Williams et al., 1990),
whereas coordination and control in larger and
more complex organizations tend to rely on
sophisticated and formalized MASs (e.g., Bruns &
Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 1981, 1984). In sec-
tion The combined effect of departmental inter-
dependence and organizational structure on MAS
design, it was argued that MAS design in this type
of context is primarily the result of high interde-
pendence since the absence of standardization
makes it difficult to specify unambiguous perfor-
mance standards. In retrospect, however, it seems
more reasonable to believe that, in line with
departments in Cell 4 (see H4a–H4c), these
departments do not face any single dominant
imperative. Rather, as Gresov and Drazin (1997)
suggested, a so-called suboptimal equifinality
arises in these situations. That is, management
makes a trade-off between contextual demands.
The factor considered most important determines
what the structure should look like. Importantly,
this type of equifinality is always suboptimizingbecause one or several of the demands on the
organization go unattended. Furthermore, since
no single dominant imperative exists, there is also
an enhanced likelihood of design variation among
these departments (see also Gresov, 1989). The
fact that all three MASs can be found in approx-
imately equal proportions (1/3) in this context may
be consistent with this argument.Concluding comments and implications for future
research
Amain argument for this study was that there is
a lack of research where the effect of multiple
contextual factors on MAS design is examined
simultaneously. At a broad level, the results re-
ported here support the notion of a combined ef-
fect of departmental interdependence and
organizational structure on MAS design.
A number of directions for further research
emerge from this study. Firstly, cluster analysis
seems useful for exploring the way in which a wide
range of dimensions combines. This approach has
been widely used in organization theory (Drazin &
Van de Ven, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1984), but
until recently, rarely in MAS research (Chenhall &
Langfield-Smith, 1998a; Greve, 1999; Johansson,
2001). The MAS categories found in this study
provide a broader picture of how different ele-
ments of the MAS make up a system, where the
different components may complement as well as
replace each other. The approach also shows that
it may be difficult to place identified categories on
a single scale (a technique often used in contin-
gency research). For example, it is difficult to place
the three organization categories found along the
often used mechanistic/organic continuum. Hence,
the use of categories, rather than single one-
dimensional variables, may give a clearer picture
of the appropriateness of different control mech-
anisms in different environments.
Secondly, the findings suggest that it may be
important not to assume automatically that there
is a one-to-one relationship between context and
MCS design. Rather, different control mechanisms
available in the control package may well combine
in different ways in a particular context. Several
Table 9
Portion of organization structures in under conditions of
sequential and reciprocal interdependence, respectively
Sequential inter-
dependence
Reciprocal inter-
dependence
Functional unit 40% 27%
Lateral unit 33% 57%
Simple unit 27% 16%
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the concept of equifinality in their empirical work
(see, e.g., Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993; Gresov,
1989). However, to my knowledge, this is rarely
the case in accounting-control research. In the
same vein, inclusion of multiple, and possibly
conflicting, contingencies seems helpful in
explaining contradictions and unexpected pat-
terns. Therefore, an important task for future
research is to explore more systematically the
way in which important contingent factors affect
MAS design, and to investigate the existence of
alternative and functionally equivalent MCS
designs.
Several limitations of the current study are
acknowledged. Firstly, although established mea-
surement instruments were used in most of the
study, the MAS description questionnaire was
novel. Several measures were taken to increase its
validity (e.g., a pilot study was conducted). How-
ever, further work is needed to refine this instru-
ment. Of particular interest is an exploration of the
relationship between the availability of MAS
information (as depicted in the present instrument)
and managers use of that information. If infor-
mation made available to managers was not used,
there would be no reason to expect any causal
relationship between contextual factors and MAS
design (see also Chong, 1996). Furthermore, an
instrument measuring MAS information avail-
ability provides no information of how it is used.
The findings of Simons (2000, p. 208) underline the
importance of this argument:
The difference between diagnostic and interac-
tive control systems is not in their technical
design features. A diagnostic control system
may look identical to an interactive control
system. The distinction between the two is so-
lely in the way that managers use these sys-
tems.
Secondly, another limitation relates to the
analysis design in that the taxonomies of organi-
zation structure and MAS were developed in iso-
lation. This implies that possible relationships
between variables were not acknowledged. It is
also implicitly assumed that management‘‘choose’’ between different control factor ‘‘con-
figurations’’ rather than incrementally adjust sin-
gle elements to each other. It is too early to have a
strong opinion on the validity of these assump-
tions. Rather, further research is needed that
examines in more detail how different elements are
related to each other, and how adaptation pro-
cesses develop over time.
Finally, compared with most traditional studies
(which focus on interaction effects between single
contingent and single MCS factors), the research
design used in this paper has neither their statis-
tical rigor, nor their clear notion of fit. Neverthe-
less, more holistic approaches are still in their
infancy and their potential is yet to be explored––
an interesting and rewarding challenge for future
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